This paper argues that the central issue in the abortion debate has not changed since 1967 when the English parliament enacted the Abortion Act. That central issue concerns the moral status of the human fetus. The debate here is not, it is argued, primarily a moral debate, but rather a metaphysical debate and/or a theological debate--though one with massive moral implications. It concerns the nature and attributes that an entity requires to have "full moral standing" or "moral inviolability" including a "right to life". It concerns the question when, in its development from newly fertilised ovum to unequivocally mature, autonomous morally inviolable person does a human being acquire that nature and those attributes, and thus a "right to life". The paper briefly reviews standard answers to these questions, outlining some problems associated with each. Finally there is a brief discussion of one way in which the abortion debate has changed since 1967--notably in the increasingly vociferous claim, especially from disability rights sectors, that abortion on grounds of fetal abnormality implies contempt for and rejection of disabled people--a claim that is rebutted.

译文

本文认为,当英国议会颁布《堕胎法》时,堕胎辩论的中心问题并没有1967年改变。这个中心问题涉及人类胎儿的道德状况。有人认为,这里的辩论主要不是道德辩论,而是形而上学的辩论和/或神学辩论-尽管具有巨大的道德含义。它涉及实体要求具有 “完全道德地位” 或 “道德不可侵犯” (包括 “生命权”) 的性质和属性。它涉及的问题是,在从新受精的卵子发展到明确成熟的,道德上不可侵犯的自主的人是否获得了自然和那些属性,从而获得了 “生命权”。本文简要回顾了这些问题的标准答案,概述了与每个问题相关的一些问题。最后,简要讨论了自1967年以来堕胎辩论发生变化的一种方式-特别是在日益激烈的主张中,尤其是来自残疾人权利部门的主张,即基于胎儿异常的堕胎意味着对残疾人的蔑视和拒绝-被驳回。

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